A FOUR-DIMENSIONAL EVOLUTIONARY GAME ANALYSIS OF QUALITY CHEATING BEHAVIOR IN TRADITIONAL CHINESE MEDICINE SUPPLY CHAIN

Abstract

A sustainable supply chain of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) is vital for public health. However, for many years, TCM manufacturers have suffered from the quality cheating behaviours of their suppliers (Chinese herbal medicine providers). Aiming at managing those quality cheating behaviours and improving the potency of TCM effectively, a four-dimensional evolutionary game model composed of Chinese herbal medicine suppliers and TCM manufacturers was established, and two quality inspection methods were introduced: chemical inspection and biological assay inspection were introduced to screen unqualified and low-potency Chinese herbal medicines (CHM), respectively. The model results are obtained through the analysis of stable strategy and evolution paths, and the influence of some parameters such as the percentage of suppliers selected, rewards, and punishments on the evolutionary stable state was analysed by numerical simulation experiments in the MATLAB software. The results showed that TCM manufacturers can reach an optimal state: purchasing high-potency CHM at the lowest possible inspection costs. The government regulators and manufacturers can improve the quality of CHM by changing the above parameters.