Effect of disproportional voting rights on firm’s market performance: evidence from chinese firms cross-listed on u.S. exchanges

Abstract

Dual-class firms face great criticism as it is believed that firms choose this structure to expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth. We compare market performance of Chinese dual-class firms with their single-class counterparts by constructing a list of Chinese firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges. We find, contrary to the literature, that Chinese dual-class firms are outperforming in terms of market performance measured by Tobin’s Q, P/E ratio, and abnormal return in both subsequent years after the initial public offering (IPO). The reason for contrary results is that Chinese dual-class firms bond themselves to high U.S. standards from low local Chinese standards, and it is evident from the literature that when a firm bonds itself to high standards it shows a credible commitment towards minority shareholders’ rights, as well as focus on upright performance rather than investing in value-destroying projects and competes to survive in the market that imposes the high standards.