The characteristics of average abundance function with mutation of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism

3Citations
Citations of this article
5Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

Background: In recent years, the average abundance function has attracted much attention as it reflects the degree of cooperation in the population. Then it is significant to analyse how average abundance functions can be increased to promote the proliferation of cooperative behaviour. However, further theoretical analysis for average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism is still lacking. Furthermore, the theoretical basis for the corresponding numerical simulation is not sufficiently understood. Results: We have deduced the approximate expressions of average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism on the basis of different levels of selection intensity ω (sufficiently small and large enough). In addition, we have analysed the influence of the size of group d, multiplication factor r, cost c, aspiration level α on average abundance function from both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Conclusions: (1) The approximate expression will become the linear equation related to selection intensity when ω is sufficiently small. (2) On one hand, approximation expression when ω is large enough is not available when r is small and m is large. On the other hand, this approximation expression will become more reliable when ω is larger. (3) On the basis of the expected payoff function π(⋅) and function h(i, ω) , the corresponding results for the effects of parameters (d,r,c,α) on average abundance function XA(ω) have been explained.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Xia, K. (2021). The characteristics of average abundance function with mutation of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism. BMC Ecology and Evolution, 21(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12862-021-01847-0

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free