Education for morality in a complex world

Abstract

In this paper I shall address the problem of how education for morality can be reasonably conceived in a complex world. To find an answer to this question, I will first reconstruct a proposed solution to the problem developed by Michael Hand. I will then subject the proposal to scrutiny and show that it undermines an already achieved educational-theoretical level. The focus is on two objections, which I call the combination deficit of basic educational forms on the one hand and the objection from the imperfection of ethics on the other hand. Finally, I argue that the theory of non-affirmative moral education opens up the possibility of circumventing the problems that Hand’s theory entails. Conversely, I argue that Hand’s theory gives reason not to uncritically affirm the theory of non-affirmative moral education, but to work on its further development in order to conceptualize moral education in a complex world in a more differentiated way.