The disciplinary role of unsuccessful takeovers and changes in corporate governance

0Citations
Citations of this article
12Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

This study examines if unsuccessful takeovers trigger the replacement of directors and changes in other governance attributes and result in improvements in target firm performance. Using an Australian sample this study finds that following failed bids, target firms are more likely to remove directors and experience an increase in director ownership, board independence, and block ownership. In contrast, target firm director expertise and prestige decrease following failed bids. We also find that post-bid accounting and stock performance of targets are largely unrelated to changes in governance attributes after the unsuccessful takeover.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Bugeja, M., Shan, Y., & Zu, Y. (2024). The disciplinary role of unsuccessful takeovers and changes in corporate governance. Accounting and Finance, 64(1), 941–973. https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.13170

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free