Executive remuneration determinants: New evidence from meta-analysis

24Citations
Citations of this article
94Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

This meta-analysis takes stock of 121 C.E.O. pay studies published between 1998 and 2018 with the objective of identifying the main drivers of C.E.O. pay from a global perspective and contributing to the agency vs managerial debate on this ground. The meta-results disclose a positive C.E.O. pay–performance correlation (the highest correlation coefficient corresponds to Earnings per share with a 34%) as the agency theory prescribes and the governance policies promote. However, firm size still predominates as the main driver of C.E.O. pay (correlation coefficient is around 44%) according to managerial premises. Moreover, our results reconcile both approaches because results of the meta-regressions suggest that larger companies and more independent boards strengthen the pay–performance association. Additional analyses of moderating factors on C.E.O. pay forces do not provide robust conclusions, though, they suggest: (1) weak impact, if any, of both the Cadbury Report and the S.O.X.; and (2) lack of homogeneity in the banking industry despite its specific regulation.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Blanes, F., de Fuentes, C., & Porcuna, R. (2020). Executive remuneration determinants: New evidence from meta-analysis. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istrazivanja , 33(1), 2844–2866. https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1678503

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free