Does the government procurement market favor corporate social responsibility in a weak institution? Evidence from China

Abstract

This study investigates, in the context of a weak institution, the single and interactive effects of firms’ nonmarket strategies in China’s government procurement market. Based on transaction cost and signal theory, using data pertaining to Chinese government procurement contracts from 2016 to 2018, this study also provides evidence that superior corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance enables firms to obtain more government procurement contracts. However, the effect is only significant in non-state-owned enterprises. Considering the interaction effect of corporate political activity (CPA) and CSR in business to government (B2G) markets, this study finds that CPA, characterized by the political attributes of executives, enhances the signal effect of CSR in B2G markets. Further heterogeneity analysis indicates that CSR’s signal effect diminishes over time and is enhanced with high industry competition. Our findings provide new insights on nonmarket mechanisms (such as CSR), through which firms competing in China’s B2G market can compensate for the weak institution.