Are candidates rational when it comes to negative campaigning? Empirical evidence from three German candidate surveys

Abstract

This article tests the assumption that candidates’ attack behavior is a result of their rational consideration of potential benefits and likely risks. Based on candidate surveys from three German state elections, we demonstrate that (i) attacks are an important strategy; (ii) on balance, candidates regard attacking opponents as a costly instead of a beneficial strategy; (iii) the differential between benefits and costs is positively associated with attack behavior; nevertheless, most candidates attack at least sometimes even when costs exceed benefits; (iv) candidate characteristics and the electoral context are rarely reflected in benefit-cost calculations; and (v) the theoretically assumed mediating role of the benefit-cost differential on attack behavior applies only to some explanatory factors. While the findings provide some evidence for rational choice explanations of negative campaigning, they also challenge some central assumptions. As such, they demonstrate the need for more comprehensive theoretical explanations and measurements of negative campaigning.