Virtue ethics, narrative, and revisionary accounts of rightness

Abstract

Some virtue ethicists, most notably Rosalind Hursthouse and Daniel Russell, have proposed a revisionary account of right action, where “right action” is a matter of action assessment, and indicates that a given action is morally excellent and praiseworthy. The account emphasises both (i) an agent’s past and how she came to be in certain circumstances-is it a result of her own vice or wrong actions? and (ii) the agent’s own future happiness and well-being-will an action be so terrible that her life is marred and ruined? The narrative structure of an agent’s life thus plays a significant role in determining whether an action is right. Kawall thinks the revisionary account faces significant obstacles. In particular, he argues that non-virtuous agents can perform actions that are far more praiseworthy and excellent than many of those characteristic of virtuous agents, even in circumstances that no virtuous agent would find herself in. Kawall also considers cases where virtuous agents face terrible circumstances through no fault of their own and must act in ways that will inevitably mar or ruin their lives. Hursthouse and Russell argue that such circumstances make it impossible to perform a right, excellent action, given that it is a cause for sorrow and robs the agent of their ongoing peace of mind. Kawall thinks the revisionary account implausibly limits the scope for right action under difficult or oppressive conditions and argues that it risks being excessively and implausibly egoistic by focusing on the peace of mind and flourishing of the agent herself in assessing the impacts of her actions.