Differential Game Study of Competitive Green Supply Chain Based on Green Public Technology Innovation and Product Greenness

Abstract

Green public technological innovation is regarded as an indispensable tool for realizing sustainable development and coping with global challenges, and the major social challenges and global problems faced by mankind nowadays have put forward higher requirements for green technological innovation in the public sector. This paper considers the dynamic process of technological innovation, constructs a green public technology innovation supply chain consisting of the government and two competing manufacturers, uses a stochastic stopping model to portray the impact of the dynamic process of technological innovation on the green technology innovation supply chain, and studies the equilibrium strategies of green technology innovation under three models of decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, and government subsidy decision-making between the government and the manufacturers based on a differential game model. It is found that: 1) Higher probability of successful technological innovation and product greenness enhancement can effectively incentivize the government and manufacturers to increase R&D investment in green technological innovation before successful technological innovation; 2) Supply chain members will consider the marginal profit after technological innovation when deciding the R&D investment before technological innovation success; 3) Manufacturers' competition is beneficial to increase manufacturers' investment in technological innovation, but it will lead to a decrease in the rate of government subsidy. Government subsidies help to increase both parties' technological innovation investment and product greenness and achieve higher supply chain profits; 4) The centralized decision-making model can achieve the optimal green technology innovation strategy, product greenness, and supply chain profits compared with the decentralized decision-making model.