Safeguardability analysis for an engineering scale pyroprocess facility

Abstract

A qualitative safeguardability analysis was undertaken to investigate the safeguards system and draw recommendations for enhancing the performance of the safeguards system for an engineering-scale pyroprocess model facility. The analysis utilized INPRO proliferation resistance (PR) assessment methodologies including diversion pathway analysis. Uranium and transuranic metal (U/TRU) products emit high neutrons and gamma-rays, which are strong enough to be detected by the passive nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements and the hot-cells can role as inherently robust containments. Even though the product materials could be attractive, the abrupt diversion of U/TRU ingots through the selected pathway from the model facility will be reasonably difficult and detectable by applying the appropriate safeguards measures. For the design features to support safeguards implementation of the facility, more effective utilization of the inherent containment and enhancement of portal monitoring as well as focusing on the accounting material flow into and out of the system will make it possible to satisfy the safeguards goal. © 2012 Atomic Energy Society of Japan.