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Prizes versus wages with envy and pride

Japanese Economic Review (2013) 64(1) 98-121
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00564.x
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Abstract

We show that if agents are risk-neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk-averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses). © 2012 Japanese Economic Association.

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Dubey, P., Geanakoplos, J., & Haimanko, O. (2013). Prizes versus wages with envy and pride. Japanese Economic Review, 64(1), 98–121. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00564.x

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