A game study on the evolution of carbon emission reduction behavior of Chinese power enterprises

Abstract

Carbon verification agencies and power enterprises play a crucial role in the process of reducing carbon emissions. Under government regulation, this paper explores the low-carbon behavior of carbon verification agencies and power enterprises, considering factors such as rewards and penalties, reputation, collusion, and costs. We first constructed a carbon emission reduction game model using evolutionary game theory and replicated dynamic equations to analyze the interactions between carbon verification agencies and power enterprises under government oversight. Subsequently, this study used theoretical derivation and numerical simulation to investigate the model’s evolution and the influence of various factors on the system’s evolution results. It is found that, firstly, the carbon emission reduction game between the carbon verification agency and the power enterprises will eventually be stabilized in two states (authentic verification and carbon emission reduction) and (fraudulent verification and no carbon emission reduction), and the specific stabilization of which state is closely related to the selection of the initial values of the parameters. Secondly, within a certain range, increasing the government’s rewards and penalties, increasing the reputation loss of carbon verification agencies and power enterprises, reducing the benefits of collusion between two parties, reducing the cost of low carbon disclosure and emission reduction of power enterprises will help the construction of a cooperative pattern of low carbon emission reduction and authentic supervision of carbon verification agencies.