El post-cognitivismo en cuestión: Extensión, corporización y enactivismo

Abstract

In this paper I look into a problem concerning the characterization of the main conceptual commitments of the 'post-cognitivist' theoretical framework. I will firs consider critically a proposal put forth by Rowlands (2010), which identifie the theoretical nucleus of post-cognitivism with a convergence of the theses of the extended and the embodied mind. The shortcomings I fin in this proposal will lead me to an indepedent and wider issue concerning the apparent tensions between functionalism and the embodied and enactive approaches. I will then discuss the standing of embodied, enactive and extended approaches in the face of the dividing issue concerning functionalism, with an eye on the possibility of divorcing the thesis of the extended mind of its original formulation in functionalist terms. In this way, I shall consider the outlook of overcoming some of the conceptual tensions in post-cognitivism by thinking its theoretical framework as non-functionalist.