China’s Taiwan integration policy: The limitations of top-level design in the Xi era

Abstract

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has undergone a significant shift in its approach toward Taiwan, moving from a strategy characterized by economic concessions to one focusing on integration. Xi’s new strategic approach for the state’s united front work vis-a-vis Taiwan is characterized as ‘top-level design’ which divides such work vertically. The central government is responsible for developing policies and appointing competent functional agencies to collaborate with the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office on implementing China’s Taiwan policy while local governments are tasked with implementation. The CCP has designated Fujian Province an experimental site for policy trials towards realizing its Taiwan integration policy. Accordingly, this article examines the effectiveness of these united front operations in Fujian. Despite the provincial government’s diverse initiatives and substantial resources, implementation outcomes have fallen short of expectations. This study’s most salient finding indicates that, within the CCP’s top-level design framework, provincial officials lack both the willingness and capacity to implement policies on Taiwan. The incentive structure designed for government officials fails to motivate them, while their newly delimited authorization constrains them.