Abstract
Offline deniability is the ability to a posteriori deny having participated in a particular communication session. This property has been widely assumed for the Signal messaging application, yet no formal proof has appeared in the literature. In this paper, we present what we believe is the first formal study of the offline deniability of the Signal protocol. Our analysis shows that building a deniability proof for Signal is non-trivial and requires very strong assumptions on the underlying mathematical groups where the protocol is run.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Vatandas, N., Gennaro, R., Ithurburn, B., & Krawczyk, H. (2020). On the Cryptographic Deniability of the Signal Protocol. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 12147 LNCS, pp. 188–209). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57878-7_10
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