Nuclear chess on the Korean Peninsula: analysing North Korea’s “second mission” and strategic implications

Abstract

This article examines North Korea's evolving nuclear strategy and its implications for regional security. We analyse that North Korea’s first mission, to counter-deter the US nuclear extended deterrence for South Korea by its minimal deterrence strategy, is to be achieved. Then, the article highlights the recent shift in North Korea's nuclear doctrine, as evidenced by Kim Jong-un's statement on the “second mission” beyond deterrence. Focusing on Pyongyang's two nuclear missions, the article first evaluates the current nuclear balance between the US nuclear-extended deterrence to South Korea and North Korea's nuclear forces, shedding light on the risks of deterrence failure. The second mission, framed as reunification through nuclear warfighting, is also examined, including North Korea’s recent strategic manoeuvres, aggressive rhetoric, and large-scale military provocations. We lastly provide potential scenarios of North Korean nuclear attacks and propose policy implications for the US-South Korea Alliance to prevent the escalation of a nuclear conflict.