Long-Term Strategic Thinking, Cost Considerations, and the Partisan Politics of Ghent

Abstract

It has long been established that the presence of the so-called “Ghent systems” of unemployment insurance greatly enhances unionization rates. This paper investigates the political determinants of the choice for and against the introduction and continuation of these systems. Based on a diachronic analysis of three paradigmatic cases, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and two shadow cases, Germany and Britain, it shows that all major actors were well aware of their organizational effect during the first half of the 20th century. At the same time, it shows that long-term strategic thinking only played a major role in shaping party attitudes toward “Ghent” in countries where the prevailing party system ensured that its introduction produced clear partisan “winners” and “losers.” In all other countries, cost considerations were central in shaping party views on Ghent. The analysis shows how cost considerations can explain both bourgeois party support for its introduction and left-party support for its discontinuation.