Risk Assessment and Defense Resource Allocation of Cyber-Physical Distribution Systems Under Denial-of-Service Attacks

Abstract

With the help of advanced information technology, real-time monitoring and control levels of cyber-physical distribution systems (CPDS) have been significantly improved. However due to the deep integration of cyber and physical systems, attackers could still threaten the stable operation of CPDS by launching cyber-attacks, such as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Thus, it is necessary to study the CPDS risk assessment and defense resource allocation methods under DoS attacks. This paper analyzes the impact of DoS attacks on the physical system based on the CPDS fault self-healing control. Then, considering attacker and defender strategies and attack damage, a CPDS risk assessment framework is established. Furthermore, risk assessment and defense resource allocation methods, based on the Stackelberg dynamic game model, are proposed under conditions in which the cyber and physical systems are launched simultaneously. Finally, a simulation based on an actual CPDS is performed, and the calculation results verify the effectiveness of the algorithm.