Woolmington’s long shadow: The dissipation of the presumption of innocence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Abstract

The presumption of innocence is considered a core value of criminal adjudication across jurisdictions today. However, to be an effective protection, it must apply not merely as an abstract declaration, but as a robust procedural right. An analysis of the presumption, therefore, must necessarily examine questions of burdens and standards of proof during trial. Woolmington v DPP is a celebrated reiteration of the abstract aspect of the right, but can be read to have introduced significant gaps into the procedural protection of the presumption. Its judicial application to multiple jurisdictions under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has in fact been largely detrimental to the presumption of innocence and constitutes a significant regression to the procedural protection of the right already existent under the statutory design of the Act. This, in turn, has facilitated further legislative encroachment on the presumption of innocence in jurisdictions under the Act such as India, effectively rendering it without any procedural meaning or practical substance. The unprecedented proliferation of special criminal statutes routinely employing persuasive reverse burdens has remained unchecked, and is a result of the courts having accepted the Woolmington doctrine, thereby effectively depriving themselves of any efficacious measures to preserve the presumption of innocence.