Informational lobbying, information asymmetry, and the adoption of the ride-hailing model policy in the U.S. States

Abstract

Existing research on lobbying has predominantly focused on its material returns, such as equity returns, stock prices, and government contracts while overlooking its informational impact. This paper addresses this gap by investigating to what extent and under what conditions policymakers assimilate information delivered through corporate lobbying. Drawing on an informational perspective, it proposes that the informational effect of lobbying is moderated by the information asymmetry between policymakers and firms. Focusing on the U.S. ride-hailing industry, this study utilizes a unique dataset on U.S. state legislatures’ adoption of the model policy lobbied by ride-hailing companies. The results reveal that the informational impact of corporate lobbying is highly contingent upon the presence of information asymmetry between policymakers and firms, which can be attributed to policymakers’ resources for independent information gathering, information deliberation through public hearings or media discussions, and countervailing lobbying efforts.