Collective Security, Demilitarization and 'Pariah' States

Abstract

Demilitarization regimes under international law pose special challenges. Often the result of the retributive politics of post‐war diplomatic adjustment, legal attempts to ensure that formerly aggressive states do not acquire the military establishments, logistics or weaponry to threaten their neighbours or international peace and security, are often doomed to failure. This article considers the demilitarization sanctions imposed against Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991 in the historic context of other such efforts, most notably the sanctions imposed against Germany under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles (and subsequently enforced by the League of Nations). The primary elements shared by most demilitarization regimes are: (1) qualitative and quantitative restrictions on weapons systems; (2) control and monitoring mechanisms; (3) the rhetorical ambition of global and regional disarmament; (4) unrealistic deadlines for compliance; and (5) the implied threat of resumption of hostilities if disarmament is not achieved. Aside from the political reality that ‘pariah’ states can rarely be isolated for long, the chief reason for the failure of demilitarization is the weakness of institutional mechanisms to effectively encourage and monitor compliance, as well as to punish transgressions.