The Role of Governance and Bank Funding in the Determination of Cornerstone Allocations in Chinese Equity Offers

Abstract

This article investigates the causal factors underlying cornerstone investor (CI) participation in initial public offerings in China’s offshore Hong Kong market. Prospectus-based declarations on such allocations suggest that CI undertakings offer strong certification effects. Entrepreneurs planning for IPO thus have a material incentive to court CIs. The present analysis reveals that a firm’s pre-IPO financials and governance attributes strongly correlate with success in this field. Specifically, CI participation is greater in issuers with established long-term loan positions. Firms housing younger CEOs and a greater number of family-connected board officers also generate more CI interest. In contrast, the fraction of independent directors and women on boards exert minimal effect. However, further analysis reveals that greater independent director presence strongly supports CI participation in family-centric entities, but imparts little to no effect on such investment in either state-run or non-family-controlled private issuers. Additionally, an issuer’s political connections galvanize CI participation. Moreover, the present study highlights the importance of family resources (in non-state sponsored entities) and political connections (in state-held firms) in drawing-in CI involvement. Given the spread of CI arrangements to other primary market settings, the present enterprise also offers guidance on anchor investment elsewhere.