Political appointments in municipal governments and bureaucratic performance: evaluating achievement

Abstract

This article discusses the politicization of the bureaucratic structures of the Brazilian municipalities based on appointed positions. The intention is to demonstrate patterns of political appointments that reflect institutional performance. The data were provided by Munic/IBGE 2005/14 and IpoC-Instituições Políticas Comparadas/UFRGS. Firstly, the study observed the degree of variability of the distribution of these positions in municipal structures, and the quality of the appointees’ education. Then, an analysis of spatial, global, and local dependence was performed. In addition, the difference in performance among municipalities was statistically tested using the independent t-test. The test compared municipalities’ performance concerning the number and education of appointees. The study used the Municipal GDP-Per-Capita, the Índice Firjan de Desenvolvimento Municipal (IFDM), and the Índice de Governança Municipal (IGM) created by the Federal Board of Administration as proxies for performance. The results stress the complexity of local public management since some of the tests indicate the number and education of appointees as predictors of high performance while other studies do not find the same relationship.