Disinformation and Superspreaders: With Epistemic Power Should Come Criminal Responsibility

Abstract

Despite years of efforts to combat disinformation, we remain far from a satisfactory set of solutions. The rise of generative AI, which enables the creation of highly credible fake content at scale, suggests that the problem is likely to grow even more severe. Lessons from the recent pandemic also call for a reconsideration of how disinformation should be addressed. This paper proposes a new approach that focuses not only on regulating everyone who spreads false information, but also on those who hold epistemic power – individuals with the capacity to shape what others know or believe. Such a strategy has the potential to move the debate forward, as it avoids the most common objection to disinformation regulation: the fear of widespread censorship. The paper argues that an individual’s epistemic position can justifiably differentiate their legal duties, and that those who possess epistemic power should bear corresponding legal – specifically, criminal – responsibility for the abuse of that power in spreading disinformation.