Corporate Governance Disclosure from Agency Theory Perspective: A Conceptual Model for Saudi Listed Companies

Abstract

Objective: The study emanates from the phenomenal challenge of weak disclosure of corporate governance (CG) in the yearly reports of companies globally. Towards the goal of addressing this weak disclosure, this study develops a conceptual model aimed at better comprehension of factors influencing disclosure. Methodology: This paper is developed on the basis of review of studies relating to CG board, from board directs aspect, specifically the agency theory perspective. The paper recognized three vital factors that possibly influence CG disclosure by Saudi listed companies. These factors are: board size, board independence, and board meeting. Implication: The proposed model relating to agency perspective will be relevant to statutory bodies alongside organizations by identify factors that could influence disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Further empirical studies that will evolve from such framework will be a veritable tool towards the improvement of CG disclosure among the users of information relating to financial and non-financial statements for instance shareholders, creditors, investors. Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Board Directors, Disclosures, Corporate Governanc