Absolute Numerosity Discrimination as a Case Study in Comparative Vertebrate Intelligence

Abstract

The question of whether some non-human animal species are more intelligent than others is a reoccurring theme in comparative psychology. To convincingly address this question, exact comparability of behavioral methodology and data across species is required. The current article explores one of the rare cases in which three vertebrate species (humans, macaques, and crows) experienced identical experimental conditions during the investigation of a core cognitive capability – the abstract categorization of absolute numerical quantity. We found that not every vertebrate species studied in numerical cognition were able to flexibly discriminate absolute numerosity, which suggests qualitative differences in numerical intelligence are present between vertebrates. Additionally, systematic differences in numerosity judgment accuracy exist among those species that could master abstract and flexible judgments of absolute numerosity, thus arguing for quantitative differences between vertebrates. These results demonstrate that Macphail’s Null Hypotheses – which suggests that all non-human vertebrates are qualitatively and quantitatively of equal intelligence – is untenable.