A regulated system of incentives for living kidney donation: Clearing the way for an informed assessment

Abstract

The kidney shortage continues to be a crisis for our patients. Despite numerous attempts to increase living and deceased donation, annually in the United States, thousands of candidates are removed from the kidney transplant waiting list because of either death or becoming too sick to transplant. To increase living donation, trials of a regulated system of incentives for living donation have been proposed. Such trials may show: (1) a significant increase in donation, and (2) that informed, incentivized donors, making an autonomous decision to donate, have the same medical and psychosocial outcomes as our conventional donors. Given the stakes, the proposal warrants careful consideration. However, to date, much discussion of the proposal has been unproductive. Objections commonly leveled against it: fail to engage with it; conflate it with underground, unregulated markets; speculate without evidence; and reason fallaciously, favoring rhetorical impact over logic. The present paper is a corrective. It identifies these common errors so they are not repeated, thus allowing space for an assessment of the proposal on its merits. (Figure presented.)