Halfhearted Action and Control

Abstract

Some of the things we do intentionally we do halfheartedly. I develop and defend an account of halfheartedness with respect to action on which one is halfhearted with respect to an action A if one's overall motivation to A is weak. This requires getting clear on what it is to have some level of overall motivation with respect to an action, and on what it means to say one's overall motivation is weak or strong. After developing this account, I defend the claim that one key functional expression of halfhearted action is the possession of impaired control over the action in question. Finally, I elucidate a puzzle that sometimes arises with respect to halfhearted action. The puzzle arises when an agent's commitment in acting conflicts with an agent's acceptance of poor performance. FU - Wellcome Trust investigator award [104347]; John Templeton Foundation's initiative The Philosophy and Science of Self-Control FX - My thanks to two anonymous referees for comments, and to the editors at Ergo for doing such an excellent job with this journal and this paper. Thanks also to the lively, sharp audience at Bence Nanay's workshop on action and desire at the University of Antwerp, and to Al Mele, Myrto Mylopoulos, and Matt Parrott for discussion. This work was supported by Wellcome Trust investigator award [104347], and it contributes as well to the project 'Attentional Control and Self-Control,' funded by the John Templeton Foundation's initiative The Philosophy and Science of Self-Control. NR - 34 PU - MICHIGAN PUBLISHING PI - ANN ARBOR PA - 839 GREENE ST, ANN ARBOR, MI 48104 USA