Concepts, Perception and the Dual Process Theories of Mind

Abstract

In this article we claim that the problem of the relations between concepts and perception is blurred by the fact that the notion of concept itself is rather confused. Since it is not always clear what concepts exactly are, it is not easy to say, for example, whether and in which measure concept possession involves entertaining and manipulating perceptual representations, whether concepts are entirely different from perceptual representations or not, and so on. As a paradigmatic example of this state of affairs, we will start by taking into consideration the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. The analysis of such a distinction will bring us to the conclusion that concept is a heterogeneous notion. In sect. 3 we shall take into account the so called dual process theories of mind. Also in the light of this approach it turns out that concepts are an heterogeneous phenomenon: different aspects of the conceptual competence are likely to be ascribed to different types of systems. A short conclusion follows.