Ibn Sina Avicenna and Malcolm and the Ontological Argument

Abstract

Evidence is presented in support of the following theses: (1) prior to anselm, ibn sina formulated a version of the ontological argument which corresponds to malcolm's second version of this argument. (2) an examination of ibn sina's formulation permits new criticism of malcolm's version. the latter makes the unwarranted deduction that in its metaphysical use "the necessary existent" is identified with "god" in its ordinary religious use. further, malcolm's informal explication of "the necessary existent" in terms of "dependency on privations" contains logical confusions. departing from the same premise as malcolm, ibn sina deduces a different conclusion, identifying "the necessary existent" not with a substantial creator, but with the "source of the world's dependence," analogous to the so-called "principle of sufficient reason" used by the mystics. to clarify the alleged contentions of the argument, analytical distinctions are drawn between various metaphysical categories, e.g., "essence," "existence," and "substance."