STEPHEN MUMFORD and RANI LILL ANJUM Getting Causes from Powers

Abstract

[advances a theory of causation based on a metaphysics of powers] ‘Disposition’ is a quintessentially causal concept. A disposition is something that confers on its bearer an impetus for certain kinds of behaviour: an impetus that is inherently causal. That said, disputes about the reality and ontology of dispositions rarely focus at great length on the precise nature of their connection to causation. Getting Causes from Powers is one of the best attempts in recent philosophy to remedy this situation. It is also one of the only such attempts (see, among others, Handfield [2009]), which should not be taken to render this praise faint, but rather to emphasize the importance of the work. This book aims to furnish a bold new theory of causation based on an ontology of dispositions, and in this it is successful. Admittedly, it is arguable that the core elements of this theory are not especially novel, taken individually, but taken together, they constitute a wonderfully comprehensive novel whole with impressive synthetic unity. Before considering the elements themselves, it is worth noting the starting point of this endeavour, for there are a number of substantive assumptions ab initio. Foremost, it is assumed that dispositions (or causal powers, the two terms are used synonymously) are real (p. 4, p. 6); there is no argument here to oppose empiricist scepticism regarding their nature or existence (to be fair, one chapter argues that they are perceived, most clearly in proprioception (pp. 207–9), but I suspect that if ever there were a case of theory-laden observation, this is it). It is assumed that dispositions, rather than objects, events, or facts, are what ‘do the work’ of causation; other things participate in causation only insofar as they incorporate dispositions (pp. 1–2). Pandispositionalism, the thesis that all properties are simply clusters of causal powers, is also assumed (p. 3), as is the …