Counter-factual mathematics of counterfactual predictive models

Abstract

Comments on an article by A. K. Seth (see record 2014-22711-004). In order to explain the distinct phenomenology of veridical and non-veridical percepts, Seth introduced the concept of counterfactual predictions to the Predictive Processing (PP) framework proposed by Clark. The PP framework assumes that the brain generates predictions of its own sensory inputs based on generative models of the world that are learned over time. Seth proposed to extend this framework by assuming that the brain not only makes predictions of actual sensory inputs, but also of the possible sensory consequences of a variety of possible actions. While Seth deliberately-and understandably, given the aims of his paper-decided to put "the detailed mathematics aside", the authors would like to point out that these details become of primary concern when assuming that counterfactual models can encode learned sensorimotor dependencies. The existing formalization of counterfactual PP seems to lack the degrees of freedom required for counterfactual PP explanations of phenomenological experience as envisioned by Seth. This does not mean that such a formalization is unattainable, but it may look substantially different from the one presumed by Seth. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)