Institutional Reforms and the Politics of Inequality Reproduction: The Case of the League of Nations’ Council Crisis in 1926

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Abstract

This contribution to the special issue explores how institutional reforms are shaped by and feed back into the politics of inequality reproduction. IR has recently begun to more closely study how hierarchies intersect. This article uses the analytical concept of “interlinkages” to grasp how international organisations couple intra-organisational patterns of unequal representation to extra-organisational social hierarchies. It empirically investigates the forms and effects of such interlinkages through a case study of the League of Nations’ Council crisis and reform in 1926. The reform reaffirmed the most prominent interlinkage: the restriction of permanent membership to states recognised as “great powers”. In addition, the reform created two new types of non-permanent seats which changed the pattern of representation of small states. Overall, the case study shows that the interlinkages and their effects were generated by an interplay of formal design and informal understandings both at the level of permanent and non-permanent seats.

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APA

Müller, T. (2020). Institutional Reforms and the Politics of Inequality Reproduction: The Case of the League of Nations’ Council Crisis in 1926. Global Society, 34(3), 304–317. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2020.1739629

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