Independence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in the context of the appointment procedures

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Abstract

The personal independence of the European Chief Prosecutor and European Prosecutors is a prerequisite of the independence of the European Public Prosecutor's Office. Based on the experience of the first appointment procedures and a combined examination of EU law, areas of vulnerability can be identified which could jeopardise their independence. The definition and doctrinal positioning of prosecutorial independence, such as its separation from autonomy and accountability, is not a simple task in case of a supranational prosecutorial body. However, there are international expert bodies that have drawn attention to the central importance of guarantees in the appointment procedures and transparency in ensuring prosecutorial independence, which also underpins public confidence in the process. Although there are institutional safeguards in the appointment procedures for the European Chief Prosecutor and the European Prosecutors, the shortcomings of the legislation have been exposed by the recent experiences. There is insufficient transparency in the selection of the members of the selection panel and in its functioning. In addition, the legislation does not categorically exclude the possibility that political considerations without a legal basis may be introduced into the appointment procedure. The EU regulation governing the functioning of the European Public Prosecutor's Office and the operating rules of the selection panel should also be amended to ensure full transparency of the criteria used to select the members of the selection panel and the assessment of the selection panel during selection and ranking of the prosecutors. In addition, the relevant EU regulation should be amended to make the decision-making process in the Council of the European Union more transparent and to stipulate that the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament may base their selection decisions only on the criteria set out in the applicable legislation and the opinion of the selection panel.

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APA

Márton, B. (2024). Independence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in the context of the appointment procedures. New Journal of European Criminal Law, 15(2), 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1177/20322844241228721

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