Does Mixed-Ownership Reform Affect SOEs' Competitive Strategies?

Abstract

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the leading force of the socialist economy, and their competitive strategy choice is the key to the high-quality development of micro-enterprises and even the national economy. This paper constructs the variables of mixed-ownership reform from shareholder power and board power and explores the impact of mixed-ownership reform on the competitive strategy of SOEs. We find that the higher the degree of SOEs' mixed-ownership reform, the greater the shareholder power and the board power held by non-state-owned shareholders, and the more inclined they are to carry out a differentiation strategy. The mechanism test shows that mixed-ownership reform eases the financing constraints and improves the risk-taking level, facilitating SOEs to choose a differentiation strategy. Further research states that the positive effect of mixed-ownership reform on differentiation strategy is more evident in SOEs with a better external institutional environment and higher internal control quality. This study enriches the relevant literature in mixed-ownership reform and strategic management, provides empirical evidence for perfecting the governance practice at the strategic level, and has certain reference value for further promoting the sustainable development of SOEs.