From policy access to lobbying influence: comparing exchange, insider and signalling models

Abstract

Scholars of lobbying and interest group politics typically assume that access to policymakers is a step towards influence. Yet surprisingly, the actual relationship between lobbying access and political influence remains understudied. Existing work implies a range of assumptions about what this relationship looks like. Some suggest that access is a simple proxy for influence; others imply that only those with a high degree of ‘insiderness' are able to exert influence; and yet others suggest groups mainly serve a ‘signaling function’. This research agenda note employs an exploratory approach with the aim of systematising these views on the access-influence relationship and evaluating them empirically based on cross-country survey data collected in 8 European polities. It finds that, in the aggregate, the observed relationship often follows the signaling model, where returns to access are especially high at low levels of access. Moreover, a country-specific analysis reveals that while the relationship is positive in general, its form seems highly context dependent. This sets the agenda for future research which should pay more attention to the access-influence nexus in different contexts.