Computational soundness for interactive primitives

Abstract

We present a generic computational soundness result for interactive cryptographic primitives. Our abstraction of interactive primitives leverages the Universal Composability (UC) framework, and thereby offers strong composability properties for our computational soundness result: given a computationally sound Dolev-Yao model for non-interactive primitives, and given UC-secure interactive primitives, we obtain computational soundness for the combined model that encompasses both the non-interactive and the interactive primitives. Our generic result is formulated in the CoSP framework for computational soundness proofs and supports any equivalence property expressible in CoSP such as strong secrecy and anonymity. In a case study, we extend an existing computational soundness result by UC-secure blind signatures. We obtain computational soundness for blind signatures in uniform bi-processes in the applied π-calculus. This enables us to verify the untraceability of Chaum’s payment protocol in ProVerif in a computationally sound manner.