Online template attack on ecdsa:: extracting keys via the other side

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Abstract

We retrieve the ephemeral private key from the power trace of a single scalar multiplication in an ECDSA signature generation and from that the signing private key using an online template attack. The innovation is that we generate the profiling traces using ECDSA signature verification on the same device. The attack can be prevented by randomization of the (projective) coordinates of the base point.

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Roelofs, N., Samwel, N., Batina, L., & Daemen, J. (2020). Online template attack on ecdsa:: extracting keys via the other side. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 12174 LNCS, pp. 323–336). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51938-4_16

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