The pickup of nonspecifying variables does not entail indirect perception

Abstract

A number of recent empirical studies revealed the pickup of nonspecifying variables. This raises the question of whether perception is sometimes indirect. In this article this question is addressed and answered in the negative. First, it is argued that empirical studies are likely to reveal that animals also rely on nonspecifying variables. Probably not every meaningful environmental property is specified by an informational variable. Furthermore, from an evolutionary perspective there is reason to believe that animals also attend to nonspecifying variables, even if specifying information exists. Second, it is argued that the pickup of nonspecifying variables does not entail indirect perception. Gibson's (1959, 1966, 1979/1986) conception of perception as a direct epistemic contact with the environment is adopted. It is suggested that this epistemic contact can be thought of as a continuum - the contact can differ in degree. The strength of the contact is determined by the informational variable exploited. In this framework, the animal is in direct epistemic contact with an environmental property, regardless of whether a specifying or nonspecifying variable is exploited.