‘The Butcher’

Abstract

In every armed conflict, there is at least one protagonist who is nicknamed the ‘butcher’: the Nazi officer Klaus Barbie was called the ‘Butcher of Lyon’ for personally torturing prisoners, Radovan Karadžić acquired the name ‘Butcher of Bosnia’, while Yahya Sinwar of Hamas was termed the ‘Butcher of Khan Younis’. Despite these commonalities across time and space, there exists no research into the butcher metaphor, let alone how it is employed in the context of international criminal justice. Spanning across 80years and 11 international(ized) criminal tribunals, this article examines the occurrence and legal significance of the ‘butcher’ metaphor. It supplements the empirical research with theoretical discussions on metaphors and their relevance for the interpretation of international criminal law. Although international law is replete with metaphors, the international criminal justice system is hesitant to use them. The article argues that the butcher metaphor is a legal metaphor that creates legal meaning for the interpretation of several fundamental principles of warfare: the principles of proportionality, distinction, and humanity. The victims of brutal and indiscriminate force depend upon the metaphor to describe their experiences of armed conflict and the perpetrator’s criminal acts. By not recognizing the legal relevance of the metaphor, the international criminal courts fail to revert to the metaphor in the interpretation of international law and to acknowledge the suffering of victims, whom the law intends to protect from disproportionate, indiscriminate, and inhumane violence in conflicts.